Lecture 1: Introduction to Power and Politics in Today’s World

Lecture 1: Introduction to Power and Politics in Today’s World


– Hello everybody and welcome. How is everybody today? Great. Well, I’m delighted to
have the opportunity to be giving the DeVane Lectures. And the DeVane Lectures, as you can tell, from looking around you double as being a regular Yale course for credit that students can take for credit and lectures that are open
to the general public. These lectures are going to
deal with power and politics in today’s world and by today’s world, I’m gonna mean the 30 years since 1989 and the 30 years since 1989 are and have been an incredibly
tumultuous period of very great change. And that’s for xxx unusual. For instance, if you compare
it to the previous 40 years in most of the advanced
capitalist democracies, they were a period of relative stability after World War II. In most countries, it was
an era of great prosperity even countries recovering
from World War II like the countries of
Europe were being rebuilt with Marshal Plan aid and it was a period, partly for demographic reasons, of very great political stability for people who grew up in that period. Internationally, as well, it was a period of very great stability because partly, because of the Cold War. It’s true we had episodes
like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War but as
the Vietnam War indicates, most of the conflicts within the Cold War were played out as you like, as proxy wars in other parts of the world. From the point of view of the citizens of the Western democracies, except for those who are
actually fighting in Vietnam, it was a far-off war that
didn’t have a great impact on the stability of people’s lives and that is very different
from what has been experienced since 1989; time, if you like,
has speeded up a great deal. We’ve seen incredible
change in three decades. And those are the three decades that I am going to be exploring. One pedagogical challenge that presents is that for some of us in this room, the last three decades
are etched into our minds as like it was yesterday. We experienced them in real time but there are many people in this room who were never born until long after that. For them, whether it’s the last 40 years or the last 60 years,
40 years or the 60 years after World War II, it’s all history. One of the first things I need to do and I’m gonna try and make
this a regular practice during the course is I
need to take everybody back and to make people
understand who weren’t there what it was like and then to remind people who’ve lived through it of things that they might have forgotten. So let’s just go back to 1989 in Berlin. – The Berlin Wall, once
it divided East from West, now on its way to becoming
an artifact of history. (upbeat music) This the CBS Evening News. Dan Rather, reporting
tonight from in front of the Brandenburg Gate
in Berlin, Germany. Good evening. These are the sights and sounds of the continuing celebration of Germans about the symbolic, not the
literal, at least, not yet but the symbolic tearing
down of the Berlin Wall. It’s impossible to completely describe how deeply Germans feel
about what’s happened here. East German border guards tonight were literally tearing down
portions of the wall itself, not the whole wall but
portions of the wall to make it easier for East
Germans to come into West Berlin and as the joyous hordes of Berliners were still streaming through the wall, the East German communist government said they can come and go permanently, they can come into West
Berlin, have a look and then come back home again with no special documents required. Today, what goes through
your mind and heart? – Well, of course, I look
back to all those years of hardship for the
families even more than for the country as a whole and it’s moving to see families getting together again. My feeling is that we are very close to an end of the artificial
division of Berlin and I also believe we
are close to the point where the parts of Germany will
become much closer together. This, of course, only within the reasonable
European framework. Anyone know who that was? Xxx Billy Braun, the former
Chancellor of Germany who actually would die a couple of years, three years after that, so he was one of the
celebratory crowd at that time. So that might give you a
little sense of the shock and the enthusiasm that people experienced in the latter days of 1989. This had been a period
in which the Soviet Union was clearly losing its
grip on Eastern Europe. It wasn’t just Germany. Right across Eastern
Europe, all through 1989, there had been these massive
resistance movements developing and the Soviet Union was losing, it was clearly not in
a position to intervene in these countries. And they were shedding
totalitarian control for the first time in decades. Of course, the great exception which we will be talking
about next week was in China where demonstrations in Tiananmen Square that June had come out,
meant a very different result but in most of the world, after 1989, it seemed like democracy was on the March. We saw the democratization of all of the former Soviet Union bloc
countries in Eastern Europe even places like South
Africa which had been mired in a bitter conflict for
decades transitioned in the early 1990s to a
multi-racial democracy. The problems in Northern
Ireland finally settled with the Good Friday Accords in 1997. Even Israel-Palestine which had been one of the most intractable
conflicts for decades and decades seemed to be moving towards a
resolution in the early 1990s. There were the Oslo Accords, the PLO and the Israeli government
were negotiating a settlement. Anyone who was in Israel or the West Bank at that time anticipated
that there was going to be a settlement until the assassination of one of the key
protagonists, Yitzhak Rabin in November of 1995. And that would lead to an unraveling of that potential settlement
but in the early 1990s, it’s really I think difficult to overstate the enthusiasm for change. This is the period when Francis Fukuyama was talking about the end of history by which he meant that liberal democracy was sweeping the world. In fact, at the turn of the 21st century, we finally went from a world
in which most countries in the world were not democracies
by most standard measures to a world in which most
countries were democracies by most standard measures. So it’s not surprising that
one would have had the kind of enthusiasm that
Fukuyama had at that time and that was almost, what’s the word? Just snowballing across so
much of the developed world. Enormous confidence in
democratic capitalism and enormous confidence in the idea that many people were gonna
be lifted out of poverty and that the world was heading for a kind of benign equilibrium, as an economist would say,
Fukuyama’s end of history idea. now let’s fast-forward three decades and let’s stay in Germany and
here’s a very different thing to look at. (speaking in foreign language) (audience cheering) (speaking in foreign language) So he’s a leader of the
Alternative for Deutschland, far-right anti-immigrant, anti-system political party
and what he is celebrating is that they have
crossed the 5% threshold. This is the AFP here on this graph. Germany has a 5% threshold to get seated in the parliament so if you
don’t get 5%, you get no seats, they hadn’t gotten 5% before
and now they had won 5% and so they saw themselves
as getting a foothold in German electoral
politics for the first time. Germany, in 2017 was
coming out of a situation in which there had been a grand coalition between the SPD which is the left of said Social Democratic Party
and the right of center CDU, Christian Democratic Party
led by Angela Merkel. And the SPD were very unhappy, they had been in this grand
coalition for a long time and they found that they
were paying a huge price with their supporters. They were getting less
and less of the vote for reasons we’ll talk
about later in the course and they announced that they
were not gonna participate in a grand coalition again
and they were gonna go into opposition and rebuild themselves. Angela Merkel then spent
the next six months, Alternative for Deutschland were and still are seen as beyond the pale, nobody will form a government with them. So she spent the next six months trying to put together a coalition with the Green Environmentalist Party and the so-called Free Democrats. The Free Democrats would be
what we would think of as, in this country, as
Rand Paul libertarians. They are for small
government, low regulation across the board. It’s not surprising
that she couldn’t do it because the greens want green regulation. They want environmental regulation. That’s their raison d’etre
and the Free Democrats want no regulation or
certainly, less regulation. So they stumbled along in
and out of negotiations but they weren’t able to form a coalition. However, over the course
of that six months, all the opinion polls showed that the AFD, the Alternative for Deutschland was actually rising in popularity. And so the German
president was very against having another election in
the face of the stalemate with the Social Democrats refusing to join in a grand
coalition on the one hand and Merkel’s inability to construct a different coalition on the other. They all knew that if they
went for another election, the AFD would do even better. So finally, after much hand-wringing, the SPD was persuaded after extracting a very big set of concessions,
including six ministries and the Finance Ministry. They were persuaded to go
back into a grand coalition even though a lot of their
membership didn’t want it. So terrified were they of the
prospect of another election in which the far right
would do even better. So we thought German politics
was kind of settling down at this point but the following year, this is what you see happening. – [Presnter] German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who’s led Germany for 13
years has offered to step down as her party’s leader
and said she won’t run for office again after
her term ends in 2021. Her announcement came
a day after her party, the Christian Democratic Union, saw a disappointing performance
in a key regional election in the state of Hesse. The far-right, Alternative
for Germany party claimed more than a dozen
seats in Hesse’s Parliament for the first time. The entire migrant
party now controls seats in all 16 of Germany’s state Parliament’s plus the National Bundestag
and European Parliament. – So there it is. They had also done very poorly in the Bavarian regional elections. They had hemorrhaged about
10% of their vote to the AFD in these regional
elections and by the way, the SPD wasn’t very happy either because they were hemorrhaging
support to the greens. And this is something
we’ll see playing out in many European countries. The establishment parties are
shrinking and becoming weaker and the parties on the fringes are growing and becoming stronger. And it was impossible
not to start thinking about the past and thinking particularly about the 1920s and 30s. (speaking in foreign language) – [Presenter] As a result of
the elections of July, 1932, the Nazis became the
biggest party in Germany with 37% of the vote. – So if you wanna go back to the 1930s, you can see that that video was
about the July 1932 election and you can see what happened
in the subsequent elections that it was a very unstable system. They were having multiple
elections and of course, 18 months later, Hitler came to power. And if you go to Germany, you hear very anxious people talking about is this back to the future? Is 2017 and 2018 some kind
of replay of the empowerment of extremist parties and of course, it wasn’t just Germany. In 2016 we had massive shocks delivered to establishment parties
with the Brexit result in the UK and Donald
Trump’s populist stampede to the presidency in the US, both widely unanticipated outcomes by most of the establishment parties,
pundits and politicians. And you could go around the world. In the Austrian elections of 2016, people are very relieved
that in the runoff, the Green candidate actually
defeated the far-right quite handsomely by 54 to 46% but if you look at the legislature, again, you see the
far-right gaining ground, the establishment parties
coming in fourth and fifth in the 2017 legislative elections. These are the parties that would normally have come in first and second while the far-right
party increased its vote, putting them a close third with 51 seats, while the Greens fell below
the threshold and won nothing or if you look at Belgium,
you see a center-right party retains its majority but if
you drill down a little bit, you can see that there
was an increase of support for the far-right Flemish Vlaams Belang which received almost 12%
of the vote gaining seats. If you look at Italy, you can see the center-left party ceding
power to the center-right but many of the votes for
the center-right party are coming from the league, so-called, again, a far right-wing populist party which ends up with 125 seats and 17% of the popular vote, of 109 seats and I could put up another
seven or eight or nine slides of different countries that
basically tell the same stories in country after country across Europe both Eastern Europe and Western Europe, including countries that
we thought of as bastions of civil social democratic
stability like Sweden. You see these far-right
parties doing well, Turkey, Latin America, elsewhere, where anti-establishment
parties that sometimes also verge on being anti-system parties are gaining ground in many legislatures. So if you think about the contrast between the videos of
1989 and where the world has been since 2016, it
couldn’t be more dramatic and in some ways, it’s a big downer but my first thing I wanna say
is don’t get too depressed. It’s not all of course, for depression. The central questions of
this course are three. How did we get from there to here? What are the challenges and
prospects going forward? And most importantly, in
the last part of the course, how could we get to a better place in many of the countries
that we’re talking about? We’ll spend a lot of time on the US but not exclusively in the US. I should say a little bit
about the distinctive approach that I’m gonna be taking
in these lectures, not to say it’s the best approach; there are many ways to look
at this kind of material but it is the approach
that I’m going to be using. And the first thing I would
say about this approach is that I’m going to be studying history with the tools of political science and political theory on the one hand but also using history
to keep political science and political theory honest. So what do I mean by that? Well, one thing that is remarkable
about the events of 1989 is that they supply us with
a terrific natural experiment from the point of view
of social scientists. If you look at the
literature, for example, of people who studied
European democracies, before 1989, they were essentially
cycling endless numbers of theories through the same old data set that everybody had had for four decades. And they didn’t have any
a big exogenous change. 1989 is a big shock to
the system and suddenly, we have, for instance, in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, the addition of a whole lot of new
parliamentary democracies. That creates possibilities of thinking about long-established
conventional wisdom, testing theories against new data which is the gold standard
for social science rather than testing theories on data out of which the theories
have been developed, which tend to result in
what statisticians call just-so stories, fitting
the curve to the data. Suddenly we have all this new data, coming along in real time. If you think about and
we’re gonna talk some about some of the standard
theories in political science like modernization
theory, which is a theory about how as economies modify, certain kinds of political
changes become more likely. It was long held that
modernization produces democracy. There were many variants
of modernization theory. And we will talk about some
of the differences among them but now we have new data and
whether modernizing economies will produce democracy. It is long been conventional
wisdom that democratic systems are incompatible with state-run economies. If we look at what’s happened since 1989, we’ve gone to market economies in some of the post-communist
systems but others like China and Vietnam have
become state capitalist systems of a certain kind while retaining
non democratic politics. So we’ll have cause to
think about theories of that general sort. There’s been a lot of conventional wisdom about the conditions for stable democracy that suddenly can be put to the test on a whole slew of new democracies. Is it all the economy stupid or do beliefs of citizens matter? And what kinds of beliefs matter and what about the beliefs of elites? All of these things, we can look at again, in new contexts. So we have lots of new
data to think about them, provided by this dramatic break of 1989. There’s a lot of conventional wisdom about the relations between
business, government and labor that has built up
among political economists and political scientists
over the last several decades before 1989. We now have big power shifts
partly because communism as an economic system has
been taken off the table. Well if communism, as an economic system, is taken off the table, how
does that restructure relations between business government and labor? It turns out it really has a big impact on those relationships. So that’s another of the
topics we will be looking at. How do electoral systems
affect things like inequality, provision of environmental legislation and public goods? A lot of conventional wisdom there about which types of
democracies are more likely to do that and which are
less likely to do that start to look before and after 1989 and we’re gonna discover that some of the conventional
wisdom needs rethinking. So on the one hand
we’re bringing the tools of political science and the
theories of political science to bear on the data that’s thrown up by this last 30 years of history. On the other hand, we’re using that data to keep the political scientists honest, precisely because we have
this whole smorgasbord of new results as a social
scientist would put it but then I also said
I’m gonna use the tools of political theory. So political theory, I should
confess, truth in advertising by my first profession, if
extended is a profession is I’m a political theorist. I cut my teeth in the world
of political philosophy. I’m in normative things
about what should happen, how the world should be organized, rather than empirical work
on how it is organized. We are definitely gonna be thinking about normative questions
here as well as we go along, what should happen,
what might have happened but the confession I need to
make about my home discipline is that it reminds me of
the story about the fella who goes up to a farmer in Donegal and says how do I get to Dublin and the answer that comes back is well, I wouldn’t start from here, sonny. That is to say much of
political philosophy develops theories that take no account of where we actually
are and how the theories that people argue about in the journals and in the literature
actually could be implemented in the world, if at all. And this spills over
into normative arguments made by other scholars. Thomas Piketty in his book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, argues for a 4% global wealth tax. Well, good luck with that. Who’s gonna implement
a 4% global wealth tax. So when I think about normative questions, it’s gonna be from the perspective of how might the goals
that we think are desirable actually be achieved. I am going to spend, as we go along, through the different topics
that we’re gonna be discussing. I am gonna be focusing on paths not taken, things that might have
been done differently and here the sorts of things
I’m gonna be talking about are things like NATO
expansion, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NATO alliance, we’ll talk about this next week which was expanded over
the next several decades to include most, eventually, all of the former Soviet bloc countries and there were overtures, also to including former
Soviet states like Georgia and several others. I’ll, talk about this Ukraine,
Georgia and Ukraine were both talking about,
joining NATO that part of the reason the Soviet
Union invaded Ukraine. So we will talk about
whether there was a path not taken at that time French
president Francois Mitterrand thought that NATO should be shut down at the end of the Cold War
it was a defensive alliance that had lost its purpose. How realistic was that? how might the world have been
different had that happened we’re going to be talking about the Global War on Terror I should in after 9/11 when, we invaded first
Afghanistan and then Iraq. Was there another path that would have been politically
viable that would have led the world in a different direction. We will talk about the response to the financial crisis
of 2008 in 2009, again what were their possibilities that, were, ignored or overlooked
that might have been both politically feasible
and more polished effective in the sense of policy
and so that brings me to underscore the third feature of the approach that I am
going to take in this course which is when you look at, people who talk about public policy, it tends either to be
policy wonks who just go on about what would be, the best policy or political scientists who talk about why some policies get adopted in some systems and not in other systems but there’s very little discussion of what is the effective political way of achieving a good policy or the effective political way of blocking a bad policy and so when I
talk about innovations in the last part of the
course, it’s very much going to be in a way that marries considerations of politics to considerations
of good public policy so, that that is the flavor of what we’re going to be doing here and as I said it’s not the
only way one might study these materials ,but it’s
the way that we’re going to be doing it in this course. Let me talk a little bit
about the shape of the course. It falls into five, sections. The the first one is going to starting on Monday deal with the
collapse of communism and its aftermath. There we going to look
at collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in Russia, in China and in Vietnam.
Although I will talk about some other countries along the way. We’re going to talk about
the rise of a unipolar world, until 1989, we had a
bipolar world in which, as I said a lot of actual stability, that came about as a
byproduct of the Cold War at least among the the major powers even if they maintained this stability, partly by, acting out their conflicts in proxy wars in, Asia, Africa and at America but it by and large the great powers were the
nucleus standoff worked and we didn’t have a major
conflict between them. Now we have gone to a
unipolar world dominated, by a single power ,after 1989. How does that restructure politics and the possibilities for
politics that will be also part of our concern. And then I’m going to
talk about the, politics of the economics. What I’m going to call the
rise of neoliberalism at home and the Washington Consensus abroad and this is put on this is basically it comes to, exist because of the collapse of an
alternative to capitalism, the disappearance of communism
as a viable, political system as a viable economic system and so you have this idea that’s
often called neoliberalism that basically has three elements. Its trade deregulation,
trade deals getting rid of restraints on trade, getting
rid of internal regulation within countries, and
massive privatization of formerly state assets that was called, the neoliberal approach to political public political economy. And when it’s translated into a set of recommendations or requirements for countries in the developing world, it was called the Washington Consensus, was essentially adopted by the World Bank by the IMF as a condition for giving loans to developing countries and it, was essentially taking
neoliberalism global. And so the, post communist era is marked by, this massive confidence in, the the capacity of unregulated or mildly regulated
free-market capitalism, to deliver the best results,
for every country in the world then we’re going to talk about the new global order, that
is ushered in by this. We’re going to look at
whether democracy really was on the march the people thought about a potential we had talked again the conventional wisdom in
political science was that the democratization had
preceded in three waves. The first wave being
the gradual expansion of the franchise in what we think of today as the older democracies, the second wave being decolonization in Africa and Asia and Latin
America after World War II. The third wave coming in 1989 to 1991 and people started to
wonder whether there’s a fourth wave now with
democratization of South Africa with settlements in places
like Northern Ireland, initially with the Arab
Spring people wondered whether we were going to start to
see more democracy as part of this new global order. Then we’re going to look at
the international institutions that developed in this global order, we’ll talk about things like, the International Criminal Court which for the first time would
hold dictators to account for their activities of repression. There was the creation and of
something called a doctrine at the United Nations called
the responsibility to protect. Responsibility to protect, says that this was in the wake of, things
like the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and what happened in
Kosovo, in 1999 eventually we got responsibility
to protect where the UN was said all governments are going to be held accountable for
severe human rights violations within their own territories
and if they don’t respect them, the UN is going to intervene,
militarily this is you know a big change we’re saying we’re not going to respect the sovereignty of Nations so the new international
order seems to be, affecting not only
relations among countries but relations within them. The third part of the course I’m calling the end of the end of
history and this is really, has its ultimate roots with 9/11 and the emergence of the
global war on terror. The invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and eventually the collapsing Syria we’re going to see that
the idea that history was heading in some benign direction, was getting harder and harder
for people to hold on to. we’re going to look at the
resurgence of state capitalism. we’re going to look at
what China was, has been and is doing in Africa. We are going to be looking
at Russia’s resurgence as a global power, they had
been back on their heels, for much of the 1990s and early 2000 but now they became actively
involved, in, the Middle East and elsewhere, we’re going to, look at, the new role of business in
many political conflicts around the world sometimes with
benign purposes in mind, but often not and so we’re
going to start to see a much messier politics. The fourth part of the course, is about the new politics of insecurity. This is really ushered in not so much by the financial crisis
itself, but by the way in which governments responded
to the financial crisis and this will be one of the areas where we will be looking
at paths not taken but, we will see that there
was, growing insecurity in the workforces of many
of the advanced democracies that had been building up for decades, and the financial crisis, threw into sharp relief the fact that most governments
were not doing much about it if anything at all and in fact that they ended
up bailing out the elites, while doing nothing much, for the people who have been
most harmed in the crisis and so we will look at the response to, the financial crisis in a number of countries
particularly in the US and then we will all in the
last part of the course, what is to be done that
great Leninists slogan, we will be looking at, two things really. First how the, voter sentiment in these countries was,
so poorly misdiagnosed by so many, political elites and people in control of
political parties, misdiagnosed to the point where not only
did they fail to respond, to the growing economic insecurity, that was experienced by many,
many millions of workers within their own countries. They were actually
implementing political reforms that were likely to make things worse. And so the last part of the
course will be looking at those two interacting issues. What sorts of economic
policies were pursued or failed to be pursued. What kinds of policies
might have been pursued and how did the reform
of political systems over the last 15 or 20 years, make the problem worse
and that will lead me, to make some arguments, about
how we should, think about, politics going forward. So, that is what we’re going, to be doing. It’s a big menu, we have, you know we have 26 now soon to be 25 lectures in which to explore it. I’m going to, before breaking today, I’m going to talk about
a few logistical matters. One is that I have been
asked to announce but you can see for yourself, that the Office of Public Affairs is, taking pictures and
these lectures are going to be videotaped. And this will include, we
will have microphones so we can have questions from
the floor and interaction but you should know that, this is all being tape recorded and so anything you say can be taken down and used in evidence against you. So, a couple of other logistical things. One is I want to introduce
Christina Seyfreid. Christina, she’s the head teaching fellow for the course so for
she will be overseeing the grading of students
who are taking the course, for, credit and she will
also be working with me, in, running office hours for
people from the community, which we’re both going to be doing. I’ll say a little bit more about that in a minute but, you will see more of Christina as we go along. Office hours I’m gonna be having office hours in Rosenkranz room 201 from 10:00 to 12:00 on
Wednesdays and Fridays. The presumption there is that from 10:00 to 12:00, Yale
students have priority. These are walk-in office
hours not by appointment and on 10:00 to 12:00
on Fridays, people from the community have priority but who knows if anyone will show up but
that’s the way it’ll work 201 Rosenkranz Hall
which is right opposite, the new colleges up the street. Christina is going to have office hours for people from the
community on Thursdays, from 5:00 to 7:00 at a place yet to be announced and one
thing we’re going to do, the office hours are not just
going to vanish into the ether we’re going to, Christina and I are going to film five sessions over the course of the semester, where she and
I will discuss what’s come up in the office hours and we will post that, on the course website. I do this with my Coursera course and it proves to be quite helpful. So, we will get questions that have come up in the office hours both in our office hours
and in office hours, between the students and
the Teaching Fellows, that they will be participating
as well and we will publish those videos of the office hours on the course website. Access to reading. Anyone who has a Yale
ID can get almost all of the readings on Canvas, there’s a few, I think three of the book, we’re using too much for copyright reasons
to put them on Canvas but they’re all in the library for anyone who doesn’t want to buy any. The, people from the community
we have, made available in the New Haven Public Library
if you don’t have access to Canvas us a couple
of sets, of the books that we’re being using in the course or you can get them that way. Those who are taking, the
students who are taking the course for credit the official exam is the last afternoon of
the last day of exams, which I’m sure some of you have
already bought plane tickets that are, inconsistent with that. So actually we’re going to
have to alternate exams. One on December 11th and this is primarily to accommodate SOM students because, of the timing of the SOM
elective, exam period and that exam will, if we can arrange it be held at SOM, and then there’ll be, but others can take it
then as well if they want. And then there’ll be an another
alternate exam on Friday the 13th so there’ll be different times at which people can take the exam. Policy here will be no laptops,
no screens, no iPhones. I came to this policy
a couple of years ago. It definitely works better. It’s just too tempting to be
doing that Amazon shopping for your grandmother’s birthday present that you forgot about
and it’s very distracting not only for the people
around you but it’s also distracting for me, to teach. We will post the slides on Canvas and on the course web page off the lectures so people will have access, to the slides. What you’ll find is if
you go and you look at the slides on Canvas, they’ll look like they’d
been turned into a PDF and the video will not play. If you want to play the
video, you have to download the slides and then it will
read, it will regurgitate as playable videos, so it is possible to play the video, yes so no laptops, no screens, no phones and everything, everything I
put up here will be available to you, so you don’t have
to take copious notes of what appears on slides. Comments, questions. Yes, sir, you’re gonna have to yell. We will have microphones
here starting next time. (student speaking faintly) You can’t. So that’s why we put a
set of the reasonings in a New Haven library
and the reason for it, it’s not just Yale being mean. It turns out there’re two
sets of copyright rules so if you are photocopying
chapters from a book, you are allowed to take
up to 10% of the book, otherwise you have to buy the book if you’re using it but
universities, for their students, have a more permissive rule. So we can take more than 10% from a book. I’ve forgotten what the exact number is but it’s much more than 10%. We can take more than 10% from a book and put it up on Canvas
if it’s only available to Yale students but if
we made them available to the general public, Yale would be violating copyright laws. So that’s why we have bought
two complete sets of the books and put them in a New
Haven Public Library, from which we have been
xeroxing most of this stuff. So you should be able
to get the vast majority of the readings if you wanna go down there and get them. Other questions, comments, observations? If there’s a question in your mind, it’s probably in the
mind of 30 other people so they’ll be grateful if you ask it. Yeah, you just have to yell. (student speaking faintly) Are we gonna look at the
European Union as well as what? (student speaking faintly) We’re certainly gonna look at the growth of the European Union and the expansion of the European Union since, in fact, we’re gonna talk about it next class. We’re gonna look at the
expansion of the European Union since the Cold War. I’ll talk very briefly about the early, this course is really post 1989. We’ve just hired David
Engerman and Arne Westad, who are both cold war historians who are gonna be teaching
courses on the Cold War. So if you really wanna deal
with the post-war Europe from into war Europe II to
the end of the Cold War, these are the guys who
are gonna be teaching that stuff going forward in Yale College. So I’m very consciously not doing that. So I will talk about the way
in which the European Union was formed which has had a lot to do with its current troubles but mostly, I’m gonna focus on since 1989. Yeah, pardon? (student speaking faintly) There are no sections in this course. This is why we have an
hour and a quarter lecture rather than a 50-minute lecture. Yeah. (student speaking faintly) The topics for the papers
will be posted two weeks before the papers are
due and we will give, I should say a couple
of things about that. This is not a research course so you can write a first-rate
paper based on reading the material on this syllabus. You are not expected to
go beyond the syllabus. And we will post, two weeks
before the papers are due, a list of topics of and it will be, there will be very significant
amount of choice on it so we’ll probably give you
four or five possible topics to write about. Yes, sir. What is the expectation
for graduate students? The same course requirements,
two papers and a final exam. Yeah. Yes, sir. Pardon. – [Student] Is there a
limit for (mumbles) students to join the class? – No, there’s no limit. This is an uncapped course. I’m hoping we can stay in
this room, it looks like it. Numbers tend to go down rather than up during shopping period. It’s not a capped course. Yeah. (student speaking faintly) People have taken courses
with me before know that I have a pretty
interactive lecturing style. So yes, there will be microphones and there will be questions. I’m not planning to talk
for an hour and a quarter every Tuesday and Thursday. So there will be significant
amount of interaction. Yes sir. (student speaking faintly) Yeah, we currently, I believe, have six in addition to Christina’s
Teaching Fellows, all of whom will be holding office hours. They’ll be available and
you will be able to go and talk to them about
what’s come up in the class, about your papers and so on. And the conversations you have
with those teaching fellows, we will also address then in
the videotaped office hours that we post. Okay. So any other questions,
comments, reactions? So on Tuesday, we’re gonna talk about the collapse of the Soviet
Union from Soviet Communism to Russian gangster capitalism. I will see you then. (music)

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